Developing countries employ about two fifth of the world's researchers, originate one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation. Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North-South setups in which the South is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of IPR policies on developed and developing countries we extend this literature to allow not only for southern R&D and imitation of northern goods, but also imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on R&D efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern R&D, welfare, and a reduction in the North-South wage gap. Below the R&D threshold a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote R&D and decreases welfare and wages. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.
Introduction
The distribution of R&D efforts between developed and developing countries is changing. In its Science, Technology and Industry Outlook, the OECD (2008) reports that the distribution of Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) shifts towards non-OECD countries whose share in global R&D increased from less than 12% to over 18% from 1996 to 2005.
A similar pattern arises for business R&D expenditures of profit-oriented enterprises. In China, South Africa, Russia and India, the ratios of R&D expenditure to GDP exceed those of high income countries like Greece and Portugal. UIS (2009) 2 reports an even higher share of developing countries in world R&D for 2007: developing countries accounted for almost 24% of world GERD and employed almost 38% of world researchers. The extent of investments in R&D is closely correlated with the level of domestic IPR protection. 4 For earlier periods, i.e. before TRIPS was established, the plot looks qualitatively similar, but the data are somewhat shifted to the left, i.e. to lower levels of IPRs. See Park (2008a) for the sources of changes in the index. The same observation is made in Ginarte and Park (1997) who find that high income countries provide the highest level of IPR protection.
5 That there is also a threshold level for IPRs and growth which is dependent on the level of human capital in a country is shown by Mohtadi and Ruediger (2010) using a threshold estimation technique. The division of countries into industrialized innovating countries (the North) and imitating developing countries (the South) in the theoretical literature does not account for the increasing investments in R&D in developing economies shown by these recent surveys 6 and does not allow for scenarios of a transition of imitator countries to successful innovators as demonstrated by Asian Growth miracles like South Korea, Taiwan and earlier Japan.
In this paper, we develop a North-South increasing variety model which allows for original innovation in both the North and the South, and also for the imitation of both northern and southern inventions. We show that our model can explain the IPR-R&D threshold level shown in figure 1 , and determine the conditions under which IPRs can stimulate southern innovative activity and increase welfare. We then use the model to analyze the effects of different IPR policies in the South. For the policy analysis the aspect of southern firms being also subject to imitation has two main advantages: First, it allows us to analyze the 6 Important contributions with this feature include Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Deardorff (1992) and Helpman (1993) and more recently Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) . For a criticism of the lack of southern R&D in North-South models see Park (2008b) . For two examples of models in which the South can innovate, but is not the subject of imitation itself, see (Currie et al., 1999; Glass, 2010) . For firms' private incentives to protect their intellectual property compare Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008) .
effects of stronger IPRs on southern R&D incentives directly. Second, we can thus examine the effects of IPRs protecting northern or southern goods separately.
While international treaties as the Paris and Berne Convention prescribe the national treatment principle, i.e. equally strong protection for domestic and foreign innovations, this principle might not be followed by developing countries. For instance, as Kumar (2003) describes for the case of Japan until the 1970s, IPR legislation might be in place to unilaterally advance domestic technology adoption from abroad. Thus the second contribution of this paper is to analyze the effects of discriminatory southern IPR policies on both regions.
We find that southern R&D takes place if IPRs surpass a critical threshold level. This critical level is lower for higher southern research efficiency and a larger southern population. This implies that large countries with efficient R&D sectors are likely to engage in innovation even under weak IPR regimes. Likewise, to stimulate an inefficient R&D sector in a small country, IPRs have to be very strong. In stimulating southern R&D, the protection of northern and the protection of southern innovations are shown to work as imperfect substitutes. If R&D takes place in the South, strengthening IPRs for both regions' innovators increases welfare in both regions. In contrast, an increase in IPRs that does not surpass the threshold level fails to stimulate R&D, increases the wage gap between the regions and decreases real consumption in the South.
We show that a southern deviation from the national treatment principle (increasing IPRs for domestic firms only), does not harm either region if southern R&D does not take place, and it benefits both regions if southern R&D is conducted: By increasing R&D incentives for southern firms, it shifts the southern attention away from the imitation of northern goods.
The next section discusses the related literature, and section 3 describes the model. In section 4, we describe the equilibrium, state the conditions under which southern R&D takes place and analyze the effects of different IPR policies on innovative and imitative activity and wages in the two regions. In section 5, the model is calibrated to analyze the welfare and employment effects of stronger IPRs, and section 6 concludes.
Related literature
In this section, we compare our results to the conclusions drawn by papers which are most closely related to our work. These papers are different from the seminal North-South models by, i.a., Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Deardorff (1992) and Helpman (1993) in that they do not focus on the conflict between the innovating North and the imitating South, but are more concerned with the trade-off between imitation and innovation within the South.
In Currie et al. (1999) , the South has the options to imitate the North or innovate with knowledge dissipating gradually from the North to the southern knowledge base. While not treating the effects of changes in IPRs, Currie et al. (1999) argue that subsidies to the imitation sector have qualitatively the same effects as a loosening of IPRs. The following features distinguish our model from Currie et al. and 
lead to partially different results:
First, we analyze the problem in a semi-endogenous framework to match the empirical observations of non-scale growth as in Jones (1995) . Thus policy changes do not imply long-run changes of the growth rate in our model. Second, we include the empirical feature of decreasing returns to R&D into the imitation and innovation processes. This allows the South to engage in R&D even if the wage differences between the regions are large which is not possible in Currie et al.'s framework, but empirically more plausible. Third, while changes in subsidies to imitation do not have any welfare implications for the case in which the South only imitates in Currie et al. (1999) , we show that in this no-innovation case stronger IPRs for innovations of both regions decrease welfare, but can help to stimulate R&D if they surpass a threshold level. Finally and most importantly, we are able to analyze discriminatory IPR policies as we allow for southern goods to be also subject to innovation.
The protection of northern IPRs affects innovation incentives for the South only indirectly by making the alternative (imitation) more costly. In our model, general IPR protection has the direct benefit of increased expected profits for southern innovators. We can thus show that IPRs exclusively for southern goods benefit both regions if southern R&D is present: they increase R&D profitability for the South and thus shift resources away from imitation of the North.
Glass (2010) also analyzes imitation and innovation in the South, but focuses on how imitation encourages R&D by providing the South with a sufficient knowledge base. She builds a product-cycle model in which an exogenous fraction of industries has to engage in imitation before being able to target the market for innovations and analyzes subsidies to northern and southern R&D and imitation. IPRs are not treated explicitly but indiscriminate subsidies to imitation and innovation are considered instead. The result suggests that when imitation is a prerequisite to southern innovation, undirected subsidies can increase the rate of innovation relative to imitation. However, these policies do not have any implications for the wage rate if the South innovates, and welfare changes are not considered in her paper.
We emphasize that the focus of our paper is different from Glass (2010) : While she analyzes how imitation can serve as a stepping stone to innovation, our paper examines how the South's choice between innovation and imitation is influenced by different IPR policies. Newiak (2011) analyzes how imitation can encourage R&D in countries whose innovation sector is small compared to those in which the R&D sector is sufficiently large. The results of her model suggest that the effect of IPR policies depend crucially on the state of the R&D sector's development and the main channel of knowledge accumulation in the country. The model does not allow for imitation of southern products so that IPR policies considered in the two papers are different: while in Newiak (2011) an increase in IPRs always means that one source of knowledge is harder to access, we reveal a channel through which stronger IPRs are never harmful to R&D and welfare in the South while they can also benefit the North: stronger IPRs for southern innovations.
The Model

Basic set-up of the model
Two regions interact in our model, a group of developed countries (the North) and a group of developing countries (the South). Firms in North and South hire labor for the production of consumption goods and for innovative and imitative research and development (R&D).
Labor is perfectly mobile within all sectors across one region, but immobile between the two regions. Thus a single wage rate is paid to all workers within one region. Trade between the two regions is costless. North and South differ in their R&D activities. The North engages in innovation only. As long as a northern variety has not been imitated, its production takes place in the North, and the innovating firm charges the monopoly price on the global market. Once a northern variety has been imitated by the South, its production shifts to the South. The South engages in innovation and the imitation of both northern and southern inventions. If a southern variety has been imitated, its production stays in the South, but it is produced at lower costs by southern imitators.
Households
Each region is inhabited by a fixed measure of households whose size grows exponentially at a constant rate g L . Each member of a household is endowed with one unit of labor which he supplies inelastically to the labor market. So the labor supply in North and South at time t is given by * t = * 0 e g L t and t = 0 e g L t , respectively. 7 Households in the two regions are identical concerning their preferences and symmetric in their maximization problem. We restrict the outline of the household's problem to the South in the following. Agents in the South maximize the discounted lifetime flow of utility
arising from the consumption of N t differentiated varieties in each period. ρ > g L is the rate of time preference. x j,t is the per capita quantity demanded of variety j, α is the degree of product differentiation so that the elasticity of substitution between varieties is ε =
Individuals are constrained by their wage and asset income:ȧ t = (r t − g L )a t + w t − e t in which e t stands for consumption expenditure, w t represents the wage income and r t is the interest paid on asset holdings a t . Solving the consumer's maximization problem for both regions we obtainx j,t , the average per capita demand for variety j by the world consumer at time t:x j,t =ē
in whichē t represents average consumption expenditure per consumer defined asē t = (e * t * t + e t t )/L t , p j,t is the price of variety j and L t = t + * t . The aggregate price index is defined
Expenditures in the South grow atė t e t = r t − ρ such that individual consumption expenditures e t grow over time only if the market interest rate r t exceeds the discount rate ρ.
7 Throughout the paper we use the convention to indicate quantities referring to the North by ' * ' and use no superscript for quantities of the South.
Research and Development
Innovation
Varieties are invented in the North and in the South. The total amount of varieties invented in the North is given by n * t = n * R,t +n C N ,t in which n * R,t and n C N ,t represent the number of not imitated and imitated varieties, respectively. Similarly, n t = n R,t + n C S ,t is the total number of varieties invented in the South with n R,t not yet imitated and n C S ,t already imitated innovations. The total number of varieties available to the world consumer is then given by:
To produce a new variety, R&D firms in the North and South have to develop an innovation blueprint. To obtain this innovation blueprint they hire researchers * R and R . The employed researchers' productivity depends on the available amount of knowledge capital which we model as a function of the number of already existing varieties: N θ . We assume that it is available to both regions equally, but that the regions differ in how efficiently they use it:
We follow Jones (1995) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) in setting 0 < θ < 1 such that the R&D difficulty is decreasing in the number of blueprints, intertemporal knowledge spillovers become weaker over time and strong scale effects are ruled out. The parameter a captures the difficulty to innovate in the North so that β > 1 means that the South is relatively less productive in the innovation process. Further we account for decreasing returns to innovation by letting the global variety growth rate g =Ṅ N enter the innovation functions in the denominator. 
Imitation
Imitation takes place in the South only. In order to obtain the imitation blueprint of a northern or southern innovation, imitation firms hire labor C N and C S and use the existing knowledge capital N θ .
10 So the imitation functions for northern and southern products are described as:ṅ
φ N and φ S capture the difficulty of imitating northern and southern varieties and are interpreted as the strength of IPR protection in the South. The higher φ N and φ S , the stronger the level of IPR protection and the higher the costs of imitation. Note that we allow for different IPR levels for the inventions from the two regions, so that the South is allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign firms. ι N and ι S are the imitation rates of northern and southern varieties which enter the imitation functions as in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) , but with an elasticity of imitation supply of one. Including the imitation rates in the imitation functions again captures the idea of decreasing returns to R&D 11 .
Finally, we introduce a distance parameter d to allow for a higher imitation difficulty for northern varieties (due to the remote original development and production and possibly higher technological sophistication).
As they operate in the same region as the innovator, imitators of southern goods do not have a labor cost advantage. In order to generate positive profits from imitation, they hire process innovators who improve the production process such that the imitating firm can produce the variety cheaper than the innovation firm. The cost advantage in production η is a positive function of the amount of process innovators P employed and a negative function of the cost of developing the imitation blueprint: If it is difficult to copy the technology in the first place, improving the production process should be also more difficult. So η is modeled as a negative function of the labor input C S needed to develop the imitation blueprint: η =η
, implying an upper bound cost reduction and γ as the difficulty to improve the production process.
Production
Labor is the only factor of production. For northern and southern innovators, one unit of labor produces one unit of output. As long as the invention has not been imitated, innovators have monopoly power and maximize their profit π
to the demand function (2). Monopolists in the North and South charge a constant mark-up over their marginal costs w * and w, such that prices and profits for northern and southern innovation firms are given by:
In the case of imitation, imitators and innovators compete in prices which drives the price down to the innovator's marginal cost of production and the innovating firm shuts down.
If the wage differential is not too high (w * ≤ w/α), the southern imitator charges a price equal to the northern wage rate w * to force the northern innovator out of the market. If the wage gap is high (w/α ≤ w * ), the imitator can charge the monopoly price. 12 As none of our results depends qualitatively on whether narrow or wide gap case is present, we present the model for the wide gap case in the following and outline how the model changes for the narrow-gap case in Appendix A. Due to the process innovation described in the previous section, an imitator of southern innovations produces goods at lower marginal costs (1−η)w.
We assume an upper bound on this cost advantage (η ≤ 1 − α) so that the imitator charges a price equal to the southern wage rate. The price and the profits for imitated northern and southern goods are given by:
Financial sectors
The value of an innovating or imitating firm v R or v C is given by its expected discounted profits. As there is free entry to R&D and imitation, these expected discounted profits have to be equal to the cost of the respective activity. For innovating firms, the cost consists of the wage paid to the researchers. For imitating firms, it is the wage paid to the reverse engineers (and process innovators for imitators of southern varieties). Using (4) and (5) to determine the amount of labor for these activities, the firm values for innovators in North and South and imitators in the South are:
There is perfect capital mobility between innovation, imitation and production sectors within one region, but financial autarky in North and South. Agents in the North can decide between holding the market portfolio with a safe return r * or shares of the northern innovation firms which pay a return π * R /v * R . This return has to be adjusted by the change in the value of the firmv * R /v * R and the risk of being copiedṅ C N /n * R . In the South, agents have the choice between gaining the risk free rate r and holding shares of southern innovation or imitation firms. No-arbitrage between these choices implies
= r * for the North and
for the South.
Labor markets
Finally, labor market clearing in the North and South requires that the sum of workers employed in the R&D and production sectors equals the total labor force in each region. In the North, labor is allocated into R&D and production:
In the South, labor is allocated into R&D, the imitation of northern goods, the imitation of southern goods, process innovation and production:
The balanced growth path and the effects of IPRs
In this section, we define the equilibrium and analyse the conditions under which innovation takes place in the South. We then analyze the effect of different IPR policies for an equilibrium with southern innovation. The model without southern innovation is described in Appendix B.
Definition of the equilibrium and long-run growth
The equilibrium is given by a set of prices, wages and interest rates in North and South such that the allocation of labor into the different sectors, varieties and their supply, consumption expenditures and asset holdings (1) solves the households' utility maximization problem and firms maximize profits and (2) labor, goods and financial markets clear given the free market entry of firms. In this steady state equilibrium, variety growth g ≡Ṅ /N , the South-North wage ratio ω ≡ w/w * , the imitation rates ι N and ι S , the optimal cost advantage of southern imitative production η , the variety shares ξ * As the variety shares are constant in steady state, all varieties have to grow at the same Dividing (4) by N and using the fact that the R&D employment ratio * R / * is constant in steady state the equilibrium growth rate is determined as
The growth rate is finite and positive for θ < 1. This semi-endogenous growth implies that policy actions do not have any effect on the long-run growth rate.
The threshold to innovation in the South
We turn now to answering the first question of the paper: Which factors determine the innovation threshold observed in the data (compare figure 1) ? To answer this question, we consider the conditions under which innovation and imitation are beneficial in the two regions: Rearranging the no-arbitrage conditions with respect to the firm values and equating with (8) and realizing thatv * 
The left-hand side of (10) represents the benefit (the appropriately discounted profits) from innovation and imitation, whilst the right-hand side represents the cost (wage payments) of the respective activity. 13 These conditions are crucially affected by the level of IPRs (φ S and φ N ): first, they directly determine the cost of imitation (the right-hand sides of (10c) and (10d)) and second, via their effect on the imitation rates, they affect the expected profits from innovation (the left-hand sides of equations (10a) and (10b)). As the South does only 13 Note that the cost advantage in the production of southern products η is determined optimally by the southern imitation firm. To set η optimally, the marginal revenue (the increase in profits due to the decrease in the production costs) and the marginal cost of hiring a process innovator (the wage rate) are equated. Thus, both sides of (10d) are differentiated with respect to P . The optimal cost advantage can then be written as η =η engage in R&D if the expected profits and the associated costs from performing R&D are at least as attractive as the imitation of northern varieties we thus expect three parameters to crucially influence the existence of southern innovation: First, the higher the relative research inefficiency β the higher the cost of developing one blueprint and the higher the required profits to cover these costs. Second, expected profits to R&D depend negatively on the risk of being imitated ι S which is directly determined by the level of IPRs for southern innovations φ S (which we explicitly show in the next section). Third, the decision to engage in R&D depends on the ease of imitation of northern goods which is influenced by the protection of northern goods φ N : the lower φ N the easier is imitation compared to innovation. Finally, the southern decisions have to be consistent with the southern resource constraint (labor market clearing).
Combining the southern cost-benefit conditions (10b)-(10d) with the southern labor market clearing equation, we obtain the condition under which employment in the southern innovation sector is positive:
with Λ 1 = (1−α)g+α(ρ+θg). From (11) follows that the higher the protection of northern or southern innovations (the higher φ S and φ N ) the more likely the South engages in research.
Intuitively, the South is, c.p., more likely to engage in R&D if its research efficiency is high (β is low). For a given southern R&D efficiency, IPRs for northern and southern IPRs are substitutes to a certain degree: If φ N is high and therefore the costs of imitating the North are high compared to conducting own research, expected profits from R&D can be smaller and therefore IPRs for southern goods can be weaker. Further, the higher the cost of original research in the South (the higher β) the stronger IPRs have to be for northern and southern products in order to make R&D comparatively profitable. Finally, the existence of southern R&D is more likely if the southern labor force is large. This implies that for given levels of IPR protection and research ability, large countries are more likely to engage in innovation.
We plot the IPR threshold ( R = 0) in figure 2 for illustration. If (11) is not satisfied the cost-benefit conditions (10b) and (10d) cease and the model collapses to the standard North-South model without southern innovation. While we focus on the case in which southern R&D takes place in the following, we describe the no-innovation case in Appendix B.
IPR policy effects on the incentives to innovate and imitate
To obtain the rates at which northern and southern products are imitated, we combine the cost-benefit conditions (10b) and (10d) as well as (10a) with (10d), substitute for the profits and using the demands for varieties (2):
with
14 Suppose first that the South follows the national treatment principle and chooses to protect domestic and foreign goods equally (formally: set φ N = φ S = φ ). Increasing φ will then decrease the rates at which domestic and foreign goods are imitated. However, the South could also chose to discriminate between domestic and foreign innovators by increasing only either φ N or φ S . Increasing IPRs for northern firms will decrease the rate at which northern firms are imitated, but leave the risk of being imitated for southern innovators unaffected. In contrast, if the South choses to increase IPRs for domestic innovations only (φ S ↑), both rates of imitation decrease. This effect results from the impact of φ S on southern innovation: If southern goods are better protected, southern innovators face a lower risk of being imitated and consequently their expected profits increase. This makes own innovation more attractive compared to the imitation of both northern and southern goods which leads to the decline of the imitation rates. In line with this reasoning, policies which aim at increasing the southern research efficiency (decreasing β) decrease 14 As ι S has to be non-negative, the parameters of the model are constrained to η βg < φ S ∆ 1 (ρ + θg).
the imitation rates by decreasing the innovation costs and thus making southern innovation more attractive compared to imitation.
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium with southern innovation the rates at which northern and southern innovations are imitated are decreasing in (i) an increase in IPRs for all varieties, (ii) an increase in IPRs exclusively for southern innovations and (iii) an increase in the southern research efficiency. Increases in IPRs exclusively for northern goods decrease the imitation risk for northern goods, but leave the imitation rate for southern innovations unaffected.
How do these changes of imitation risks relate to the allocation of labor into the different sectors in North and South? We use the northern labor market clearing condition and combine it with the cost-benefit conditions to get the amount of labor allocated into R&D and production in the North:
The amount of labor employed in the northern R&D sector is increasing in the rate at which northern products are copied: If northern innovations are copied at a high rate, the production of northern inventions shifts to the South quickly. As a consequence, labor is set free from the production sector to the innovation sector. It follows that policies which decrease the imitation risks for northern firms (φ N ↑ or φ S ↑ or β ↓), also decrease the share of labor employed in the northern research sector.
To obtain the allocation of southern labor into the imitation of northern goods, we combine (13) with the imitation function for northern goods:
Using (12b), we can show that employment in the imitation sector for northern goods is decreasing in the strength of IPR protection for northern and southern goods φ N and φ S and increasing in the southern research inefficiency β. The higher the protection of northern goods φ N the costlier the imitation of northern goods, so that southern innovation and imitation of southern goods becomes more attractive. The higher the protection of southern goods φ S , the smaller the risk of being copied for the South, the more attractive is southern research which shifts resources from the imitation of northern goods to own innovation. This result again reveals that an IPR policy in favor of domestic innovators (increase φ S only)
can shift resources away from the imitation of foreign innovations.
To obtain the number of workers employed in the southern innovation sector, we use (14) and the cost-benefit conditions (10b)- (10d) :
in which Λ 2 = η g + (1 − η )(ρ + θg). Equation (15) consists of two terms. The number of workers which are not employed in the imitation of northern products and their production is given by the first factor. The second factor gives the fraction of these workers employed in original southern R&D. Southern R&D employment is increasing in the level at which northern and southern inventions are protected (φ N and φ S ). 15 When protecting northern goods more strongly, imitation of these goods becomes more costly and thus becomes relatively unattractive compared to innovation, thus R&D employment increases. When protecting southern inventions more strongly, R&D employment increases for two reasons:
First, imitation of southern products becomes more costly and therefore relatively less attractive compared to R&D. Second, southern R&D becomes more attractive as the risk of being imitated declines. We summarize these findings in the following proposition:
15 A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the latter statement is that φ S < 2 ∆1(ρ+θg) .
Proposition 3 An increase in the level of IPRs for northern or southern goods or an increase in the efficiency of the southern research sector (i) increases employment in the southern research sector, (ii) decreases employment in the northern research sector and (iii) decreases employment in the imitation sector which targets northern goods.
The effects of IPR policies on the labor allocated to the imitation of southern inventions
ι S +g R is explored in the numerical part (section 5).
IPR policy effects on wages and welfare
After analyzing how IPRs influence the southern incentives to innovate and imitate, we now look at whether these changes in incentives and labor allocation are beneficial to either of the regions. First, we look at the response of the wage differential between the two regions as a measure of their difference in development. Second, we outline the way we are going to measure changes in welfare due to IPR changes which will be quantified in the numerical section. Combining the cost-benefit conditions (10a) and (10b) with the equations for the imitation rates, we determine the relative wage between South and North w w * :
The relative wage between South and North is determined by the southern research inefficiency (β) and the IPRs for northern and southern goods (φ N and φ S ). Intuitively, the more efficient the southern research sector compared to the northern one (the lower β), the lower the wage differential between the regions. The equilibrium wage reveals that the protection of northern and southern goods have different effects on how far the South is behind in terms of wages: Stronger protection of northern goods increases the wage gap, stronger protection for domestic innovators decreases the wage gap. While both IPR policies increase the cost of imitation, stronger protection for southern goods also raises the profitability of southern R&D and thus southern wages. Suppose again, that the South follows the national treatment principle and protects northern and southern innovations equally strong (φ N = φ S = φ).
Then differentiating (16) with respect to φ gives the following condition:
This condition says that stronger IPRs increase the southern wage rate relative to the northern one if southern products are imitated at a higher rate, but decreases it if northern products are subject to higher imitation. For the national treatment case ι S > ι N is fulfilled
. This says that stronger IPRs decrease the wage difference between the regions only if northern products are sufficiently difficult to imitate.
Proposition 4
In an equilibrium with southern innovation, an increase in IPRs for southern innovations decreases the wage gap between South and North, while stronger IPRs for northern goods increase the wage gap. A simultaneous increase in IPRs for northern and southern goods decreases the wage differential between the regions only if northern innovations are sufficiently difficult to imitate.
Finally, in order to make welfare predictions for IPR policy changes, we solve for asset holdings, consumer expenditures and the economic growth rate. The aggregate value of northern assets A * is the product of the number of non-copied northern innovations and the value of a northern innovation firm
The southern aggregate asset value A consists of the sum of the values of the assets from innovating and the two kinds of imitating firms, so that it is given by A =
It follows that per capita asset holdings in the North a * = A * / * and the South a = A/ are constant in equilibrium. We can then use the budget constraint of the representative consumer to determine the per capita consumption expenditure levels e * and e as functions of the variety shares and wage rates. The aggregate price level is given by
Let c * t ≡ e * t /P t and c t ≡ e t /P t denote real consumption expenditure in North and South.
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , this measure also represents consumers' utility at time t; we thus have c
t . We solve for the equilibrium utilities of North and South using
(1):
As nominal per capita consumption expenditure e ( * ) is constant in steady state, but the aggregate price level P t is decreasing over time, utility is growing over time. As utility is proportional to consumption expenditure when prices are held fixed it can be interpreted as real consumption growth. Thus the growth rate of the utility can be interpreted as economic growth. Real consumption growth in this model is given byu * /u * =u/u =ċ * /c * =ċ/c = g/(ε − 1) ≡ g c > 0. As the steady state growth rate of real consumption in both regions is equal and independent of the policy parameters, a long-run welfare analysis of changes in the parameters of interest on welfare can be simplified to looking at changes in c * 0 and c 0 .
16 As the changes in c * 0 and c 0 are ambiguous, we leave the analysis of welfare changes in response to stronger IPR protection and different development stages of the southern research sector for the numerical analysis in this paper.
Numerical analysis
Calibration of the model
Providing analytical results for the effects of chances in IPR protection on certain economic outcomes proved to be unfeasible in the previous section.
In this section, to analyze the effects of changes in IPR protection on real consumption levels in both regions and the allocation of labor into the imitation of southern innovations, we calibrate the model with empirically sound parameters. The main aim of this section is not to get reliable quantitative predictions of the effects of stronger IPRs, but mainly to provide a qualitative idea about their effects on welfare, as measured in real consumption, in both regions.
To calibrate the model, parameters are set to match the following target moments 17 : The real interest rate takes a value of 7% according to the average real US stock market return over the past century estimated by Mehra and Prescott (1985) . This implies a subjective discount rate ρ of the same value. Basu (1996) and Norrbin (1993) 
Change of intellectual property rights protection for northern and southern innovations
The first simulation shows the effects of a general change in IPR protection in the South, i.e. when φ N = φ S = φ. The fourth column contains the benchmark case with φ = 1.5 for which the South is active in original R&D ( R > 0) and the wage differential is such that the wide-gap case applies (ω < α). For lower values of φ up to the threshold value of about 1, no innovation takes place in the South as R&D incentives are too weak given the ease of imitating the North. Table 1 shows that the South loses from the strengthening of IPR protection both in terms of real consumption and relative wage until the innovation threshold is reached. This is due to the detrimental effect of IPR protection for northern varieties.
The South relies on imitation of the North to obtain production blueprints. With higher protection, imitation employment leads to fewer imitation blueprints. The lower marginal productivity reduces wages and leads to an increase in production of each variety as their price declines. Overall, employment shares do not change in the South up to the threshold.
However, fewer varieties are produced in larger quantities for lower prices. Northern research declines slightly before and more noticeable after the threshold is passed. After an initially high imitation employment and therewith imitation rate of southern innovations, both reduce as a consequence of better protection and increased profitability of southern original R&D compared to imitation. Surprisingly, the North does not benefit from an increase in the protection of its goods before the threshold. This is due to the reduction of innovation on the one side, but more importantly due to reduced supply of lower priced imitated goods on the other side. Once the threshold is passed, both regions experience an increase in real consumption with the South starting to catch up in relative consumption. 
Change of intellectual property rights protection for southern innovations
The simulation in table 2 
Summary of main numerical results
The long-run consequences of a strengthening of IPRs for northern and southern innovations in the South is welfare decreasing for the South and has negligible effects for the North if the 18 Note that C S includes both imitators and process innovators in the graphs. South does not engage in innovation. An increase in IPRs exclusively for southern goods is shown to have no effect on any of the regions welfare outcomes if it fails to pass the threshold level and thus fails to stimulate R&D in the South. With southern innovation, stronger IPRs for both northern and southern goods are related to higher welfare in both regions. Finally, a deviation of the South from the national treatment principle by raising IPR standards for exclusively domestic firms raises welfare in both regions by shifting the southern resources away from the imitation of goods to original innovation.
Concluding Remarks
This paper gives a theoretical explanation for the empirically observed threshold effect in the relationship between IPRs and innovative activity. We show that the protection of southern and northern innovations can work as imperfect substitutes in encouraging southern R&D though they work via different channels: While the protection of southern innovations affects expected profits from R&D directly, stronger protection of northern goods achieves this effect mainly by making the imitation of northern goods more expensive. Finally, we can show that an increase of IPRs exclusively for southern goods does not harm any region in the no-innovation case. However, if southern R&D takes place, such a policy benefits both regions by increasing the southern innovation incentives and thus shifting its resources away from the imitation of northern goods. the southern innovation productivity β and the levels of IPR protection φ N and φ S . The wage gap is higher the higher the southern disadvantage in innovation β and the lower the protection of southern goods φ S : The higher β (the lower φ S ) the more attractive it is to imitate. When the imitation rates ι N and ι S rise, expected profits from innovation decline in both regions. At the same time, due to the higher imitation rates, imitation is also more costly. As a result, the southern wage declines more strongly than the northern one so that the wage gap increases.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the wage function, one can see that the relative wage is falling (wage gap is rising) with stronger IPRs for northern goods φ N .
While not all balanced growth path effects can be derived analytically, numerical analysis (available from the authors) showed that the remaining effects of changes in IPRs and research efficiency are qualitatively similar to the wide-gap case.
Appendix B. The Model without southern innovation
We turn to a short description of the model for the case in which condition (11) is not satisfied such that southern research employment R is not positive in the general model. As research labor cannot be negative, we set it to zero for both cases which restricts southern activity to the imitation of the North and production. In this case, R = C S = P = 0.
The only R&D functions are (4a) for northern innovation and (5a) for southern imitation of northern goods. Likewise, the no-arbitrage conditions for southern innovation and imitation of the South drop out. The labor market clearing condition for the South becomes =
Employment in the imitation sector C N is still given by (14), but the imitation rate in that equation is now different. Combining (10c) with the variety share ξ * R obtained from dividing the northern R&D function by N , using ξ C N = ι N ξ * R /g and substituting for * R from (13) we can solve for n C Nx C N . To solve for the imitation rate we substitute n C Nx C N and (14) in the above labor-market clearing condition. 19 The resulting quadratic equations for wide-and narrow-gap case have each only one positive solution which is given by:
in which Λ 3 = α 1−ε (ρ + θg). The imitation rate is increasing in the relative size of the South / * and decreasing in the level of IPR protection φ N . The relative wage is calculated as
Like in the case with southern innovation, the relative wage between South and North is decreasing in the strength of IPR protection for northern goods. However, compared to the case in which southern innovation is possible, the imitation rate ι N can never be zero, because imitation and the production of imitated goods constitute the only southern activities. From this fact and from (B.2 ) follows that ω < 1 for all parameter values. Consequently, the South can never catch up to the North in wages in the no-innovation case. 
